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Abstract: The paper uses a rich administrative dataset on Belgian older workers to provide 
new evidence on the impact of social security systems on retirement behavior. In addition to 
measures of financial incentives induced by the social security systems, we construct an 
eligibility status indicator. This indicator flags individuals who satisfy eligibility requirements 
for early retirement schemes. We find that financial incentives do not have a lot of 
explanatory power for the probability to retire. In contrast, being eligible for early retirement 
substantially increases the chances for an individual to exit the labor force. Using these 
findings, we evaluate the impact of changes in the early retirement eligibility rules. These 
changes are shown to have important effects on the median retirement age of older workers. 
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During the last several decades, increasing the labor market participation of older population 
has become one of the major challenges for industrialized countries. Many policy measures 
have already been implemented to boost the labor supply of older workers and reduce the 
incentives to retire early. However, as the old-age dependency ratio continues to grow due to 
the population aging, contributing to a worsening of the macro-fiscal balance.    
Several studies examined the effects of policy measures that changed eligibility rules for 
(early) retirement. Hanel and Riphan (2012), Mastrobuoni (2009) and Behaghel and Blau 
(2010) found that increasing the normal retirement age pushes up the actual retirement age. 
However, these studies were carried out for countries (United States and Switzerland) where 
the early retirement is accompanied by a permanent benefit discount. In contrast with those 
countries, there is no cut in pension benefits in Belgium in case of early retirement. Indeed, 
claiming pension benefits one year early only means forgoing one year of pensionable 
earnings and no extra actuarial adjustment. Increasing the normal retirement age alone is thus 
likely to have a very limited effect on the actual retirement age. A more significant result 
could be obtained from the policy measures that would tighten the accessibility conditions to 
early retirement and/or introduce an actuarial adjustment. Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) 
analyzed the effect of an increase in the earliest age of retirement from 60 to 62 for men and 
from 55 to 57.2 for women in Austria. They found that delaying the earliest age of retirement 
resulted in a significant increase in employment among older workers.   
The present paper goes beyond pure changes in eligibility rules. Its objective is to identify the 
role of eligibility and financial incentives on retirement in Belgium. We rely on a simulation 
model to derive financial incentive measures that we use as one of the determinants of 
retirement behavior. These measures are constructed using rich administrative data from 2001 
on wage earners. The data contain individual information on career and earnings histories that 
allow us to obtain a rather accurate approximation of social security benefits that would 
effectively be paid in case of (early) retirement. Moreover, we make use of individual-level 
information to project future earnings and the intensity of work, both inputs to the financial 
incentive measures. A further contribution of this paper is that our econometric model, in 
addition to financial incentives and other control variables, takes into account an eligibility 
status indicator for early retirement as predictor of the worker’s choice. This eligibility 
indicator, constructed using detailed career and personal characteristics, allows quite precise 
identification of individual-level eligibility for early retirement. The results show weak if not 
inexistent effects of financial incentives on the timing of retirement. However, being eligible 
for early retirement significantly increases the probability to leave the labor force. Based on 
this evidence, we conduct a micro-simulation analysis of a hypothetical policy reform 
inspired by that progressively introduced in Belgium as of January 2012. The goal is to find 
out what could be the labor market behavior of elderly in Belgium if the rules within the 
social security system were changed. An evaluation of this simulated policy changes indicates 
an important positive impact on the median retirement age.   
As compared to the previous literature on retirement incentives in Belgium (see Jousten and 
Lefebvre (2013), Dellis et al. (2004)), our model and data allow us to capture with a higher 
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precision the labor supply response to simulated policy reform. However, a drawback of our 
dataset is that it lacks information on the health status, which is likely to affect the probability 
of retirement. Jousten and Lefebvre (2013) and Kalwij and Vermeulen (2008) studied the 
impact of health indicators on the labor force participation of elderly in Belgium and found a 
positive effect of poor health on the timing of retirement. Kalwij and Vermeulen (2008) 
showed that excluding health indicators from their analysis had a very limited impact on the 
marginal effects of the other socio-demographic regressors, indicating a very low dependency 
between the two types of variables.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a brief review of the institutional 
framework within which wage earners retire in Belgium. Section 3 is devoted to the data and 
the construction of financial incentive measures used to estimate the labor force participation. 
Section 4 describes the estimation results for the early retirement model. Policy simulations 
are performed and reported in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
2. A Brief Review of the Belgian Social Security System for Wage Earners 
We focus our attention on pure wage earners for whom we have high quality administrative 
data including complete earnings histories necessary to compute pension benefits at 
individual level1. This scheme covers the largest part of the population and represents a 
substantial proportion of overall public pension expenditures. Beyond public pensions, other 
social transfers – with their own eligibility and benefit rules   also play an important role for 
early retirement. We follow Jousten and Lefebvre (2013) and take into account the four 
possible pathways to retirement once workers exit employment: unemployment, sickness or 
disability, conventional early retirement and retirement. Our description focuses on the rules 
applicable in 2001, as this is the year we can study with our data. 
2.1. Public Pension System 
Individuals qualify for the public pension (PP) benefits as long as they make social security 
contributions to the wage earners scheme. Our focal year of 2001 falls in the 1997-2009 
transition period during which the PP system was substantially revised. In the years before 
1997, the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) was set to 65 and 60 for men and women 
respectively. The Early Retirement Age (ERA) was set at 60, allowing men to claim pension 
benefits at 60 with actuarial adjustments but without stricter career requirements. The 1997 
reform introduced two particularly important changes along with several other modifications 
in the law. On the one hand, the NRA of women was sequentially increased from 60 to 65 to 
align it with the NRA of men and establish gender equality. This delaying of the NRA was 
accompanied by an increase in the required number of full career years entering the pension 
formula (from 40 to 45). On the other hand, the possibility to retire at the ERA of 60 was 
                                                          
1
 There are two other schemes, one for civil servants and one for self-employed. We leave them aside as the 
administrative dataset lacks information essential in the computation of retirement benefits. Individuals with 




maintained for both men and women with a sufficiently long career. This career condition 
was sequentially tightened over the transition period2. 
In 2001, our year of interest, benefits could be claimed at any age after the ERA provided that 
the individual accrued 28 career years. The NRA was set to 65 and 62 for men and women 
respectively. The amount of benefits depends on three factors: average lifetime earnings, 
family situation and career fraction. Average lifetime earnings include the income from work 
as well as the income imputed for the periods spent in replacement income (called assimilated 
periods). This latter imputed income depends on the wage that workers earned before they 
started receiving replacement income. In general, retirees with a full career receive a 
replacement rate of 60% of the average lifetime gross earnings. Married retirees with a 
dependent spouse benefit from a replacement rate of 75% of the average lifetime gross 
earnings. Similarly, married two-earner couples can benefit from a supplement (top-up) if the 
sum of the two individual pensions is smaller than 75% of average lifetime gross earnings of 
the highest earning spouse. All these amounts are subject to proportional adjustments for 
incomplete careers. In 2001, a complete career consisted of 45 and 42 years for men and 
women respectively. In addition, pension benefits are adjusted to the cost of living through 
variation of the consumer price index. Since 1991, there is no actuarial adjustment for early 
retirement other than that directly implied by the pension computation formula by means of 
incomplete career adjustments.3  
2.2. (Old-Age) Unemployment Insurance 
The unemployment insurance (UI) provides a replacement income for wage earners who lost 
their job involuntary. There are numerous conditions a worker has to satisfy to be eligible for 
the benefits. For example, the claimant has to prove that before becoming unemployed he has 
received earnings or replacement income for a certain amount of days. This latter period, as 
well as the reference period before the loss of job, depends on the age of the claimant. In 
addition, during the unemployment spell, beneficiaries must be actively seeking for and 
accept any job which is considered suitable. An exception is made for old-age unemployed. In 
our period of study, the unemployed aged 50 or more are still exempted from the job search 
requirement. In addition, those who can prove 20 years of career as wage earners and who do 
not receive a company supplement from their former employer benefit from a seniority 
supplement. The amount of the latter varies with age and family status of the beneficiary.  
Unemployment benefits are not generally limited in time, except when the unemployed 
reaches the NRA and automatically switches to public pension benefits. Their amount 
depends on the family status and the last wage which is limited to a ceiling. The system has 
been frequently revised during the last decades. In 2001, our reference year, an unemployed 
who lived with dependent household members received 60% of his last gross wage 
independently of the duration of unemployment spell. A single and a cohabitant living with 
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2005, sequentially increased it to 35 years. As for the NRA of women, it was first increased from 60 to 61 in 
1997 and then by one year increments every three years to attain 65 in 2009. There was a similar change in the 
full career condition: from 40 to 45 over 1997-2009. 
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financially independent members benefited from respectively 60% and 55% of their last gross 
wage during the first year. Their replacement rates for the period following the first year of 
unemployment decline with duration of the spell, the digression depending on the time 
elapsed since they started claiming benefits.  
2.3. Conventional early retirement 
The conventional early retirement system (CER)4 was created during the middle 70’ when 
many companies in Belgium encountered financial difficulties due to the first oil crisis. In 
order to protect younger workers from unemployment, the program was aimed to insure 
dismissed older workers a decent income under certain conditions. In addition to 
unemployment benefits, workers who are forced to retire early, receive from their employer a 
company supplement until they reach the NRA. The conditions one has to satisfy to qualify 
for CER are mostly related to the age, the career length as a wage earner and the activity 
sector. The workers must also be eligible for unemployment benefits that represent 60% of 
their capped gross wage regardless of the family situation until they are rolled over into the 
PP system. The amount of employer’s supplement corresponds to at least one half of the 
difference between the last net (capped) wage and unemployment entitlements. Unlike most 
of the beneficiaries of unemployment benefits, those under the CER are not required to be 
available for the labour market and actively seeking for a job.  
However, soon after the introduction of CER, employers used the system to lay off costly 
older workers who in turn were willing to retire early. As a consequence, the number of 
beneficiaries has substantially grown and the system has become very costly in budgetary 
terms. Also, the effect on the labour market of younger population has appeared to be rather 
weak. To discourage earlier exit from the labour force, the eligibility conditions have been 
frequently revised. In 2001, the minimum age was 58 and the career requirement 25 years as 
wage earner (with assimilated periods taken into account), though it was possible to retire 
through this system at earlier ages in specific sectors given tighter career requirements. An 
exception is made for companies that are recognized to be in economic difficulty or in 
restructuring, where old workers can benefit from CER as of the age of 50. However, these 
workers have to prove either 20-year earnings or assimilated periods history or 10 out of 15 
years within the same sector prior to lay-off.  
2.4. Sickness and Disability Insurance 
Wage earners, who cease their professional activity because of work incapacity of at least 
66%, are first benefiting from continued pay from their employer, before receiving sickness 
compensation for the remainder of their first year of inactivity. Apart from the 66% 
incapacity, claimants have to prove they have contributed to social security for a sufficient 
period of time. Following the 12th month of sickness compensation, the beneficiaries can 
claim disability benefits (DI) if their invalidity is certified by medical council of the National 
Institute for Health and Disability Insurance. Disability benefits are not limited in time except 
when individual is considered able to work by the medical officer or reaches the NRA. The 
amount of compensation is determined according to the beneficiary's family situation. Those 
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with dependent household members receive 65% of their last capped gross earnings. Others 
benefit from 55% or 40% replacement rate depending respectively on whether they live alone 
or within a household with financially independent members.  
2.5. Recent social security reform 
To increase the employment rate among elderly and reduce the incentives to retire early, the 
Belgian government enacted a major reform of the social security system at the end of 2011. 
The majority of the changes introduced by this reform is effective as of 2012. This section 
describes some of the most important changes related to the PP and CER systems. 
First, two main changes were introduced relative to the PP system. On the one hand, the 2012 
reform made the pension systems less generous. The imputed income for certain assimilated 
periods as of 2012 is limited to a minimum guaranteed wage instead of the last personal real 
wage. On the other hand, a transition period 2013-2015 was introduced to sequentially 
increase the ERA, as well as the minimum career condition for the early retirement, to 
respectively 62 and 40 years. An exception is provided for the workers with long career 
histories and is adapted through the period 2013-2016. As from 2016, workers with at least 42 
or 41-year career could retire after they are respectively 60 or 61 years-old. 
Second, the 2012 reform raised the CER eligibility age from 58 to 60 for both men and 
women5. At the same time, the career requirement was brought to 40 years for men and 35 for 
women. The career length for women is planned to increase further in two steps to reach 40 in 
2015. The 2012 reform also changed the conditions for companies in economic difficulty or 
in restructuring. For the companies in restructuring, the eligibility age was increased from 50 
to 55 in 2013. For the companies in economic difficulty, the same age is also expected to 
increase to 55 by 2018. 
Table 1 summarizes the timing of the changes described in this section. Clearly, this 2012 
reform is intended to lead to a deferral of individual (early) retirement decisions. Evaluating 
the impact of such policy measures becomes of a particular interest. In this paper, we use 
micro-simulation analysis to investigate the effect of a policy reform that partly reflects the 
changes introduced by the 2012 reform.  
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Table 1. Social security system before and after 2012 reform 
before after 
  
  Timing Changes 
Public pension 
    
 
Early retirement age (career length 
requirement, in years) 
60 (35) 2013 60.5 (38) or 60 (40) 
2014 61 (39) or 60 (40) 
2015 61.5 (40) or 60 (41) 
Starting 2016 62 (40) or 61 (41) or 60 (42) 
      
Imputed income for assimilated 
periods 
Last personal real wage Starting 2012 Minimum guaranteed wage 
Conventional early retirement 
    
 
Age (career length requirement, in 
years) 
58 (37 men, 33 women) 2012 60 (40 men, 35 women) 
2014 60 (40 men, 38 women) 
2015 60 (40 men, 40 women) 
       
Age for companies in economic 
difficulty (career length requirement, 
in years) 
50 (10 out of 15 last years within 
the same sector or 20 years) 
2012 52 (unchanged) 
2013 - 2018 Increase by 6 months every 
year: 55 in 2018 (unchanged) 
      
Age for companies in restructuring 
(career length requirement, in years) 
50 (10 out of 15 last years within 
the same sector or 20 years) 
2013 55 (unchanged) 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
The dataset was extracted from the "Datawarehouse Labour Market and Social Protection", 
the central administrative data registry for labor market data in Belgium. A random sample of 
100,000 individuals was drawn from the Belgian population on 01/01/2002.6 The data contain 
personal and family characteristics on the income year of 2001, as well as detailed career and 
earnings histories for each year of affiliation to wage earners scheme, at individual level. We 
also have yearly information on periods spent on replacement income for the whole 
professional career, which are accounted for in the pension computation formula. In addition, 
administrative data provide labor market information on a quarterly basis which we use to 
select the sample of interest and determine transitions into retirement. Finally, the same 
details are available for the spouses of sampled individuals. As a result, we are able to 
compute the potential pension and other social transfers today and in the future and determine 
whether an individual is eligible for either of these social security benefits at a given age. 
In order to analyze the role of social security system on retirement behavior, we restrict our 
attention to individuals above the age of 50 and below the NRA (i.e. 50-64 years old men and 
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 Originally, the data were collected for the large-scale government funded research project MIMOSIS (Micro-
simulation Model for Belgian Social Insurance Systems). The main goal of the project was to develop a tax-
benefit micro-simulation model that would allow evaluation of budgetary and distributional impact of different 
policy reforms to social insurance and personal income taxes. For further details on the MIMOSIS project see 
Decoster et al (2008). 
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50-61 years old women). We further limit our analysis to those who were in the wage earners’ 
scheme and were still employed at the end of the first quarter of 2001. The final sample 
includes 2,247 men and 1,175 women that we analyze separately. 
We follow the literature (Jousten and Lefebvre (2013), Dellis et al. (2004), Hanel and Riphan 
(2012)) and consider the exit from employment as an absorbing state. This means that 
workers who leave employment during the year of 2001 are defined as permanently retired. 
This assumption rules out the possibility of returning to work. Table 2 summarizes the main 
sample characteristics for men and women.  
Table 2. Descriptive sample characteristics: by gender 
  Men Women 
Mean age (years) 54.06 53.74 
 
(3.13) (3.00) 
Family status (%) 
  
Single 17.94 32.47 
In couple 82.06 67.53 
Active partner (%) 35.69 45.31 





Brussels 5.52 13.89 
Flanders 66.32 56.34 
Wallonia 28.16 29.77 
Occupation (%) 
  
White-collar 48.61 63.54 
Blue-collar 51.39 36.46 
Intensity of current job (%) 
  
Part-time 5.61 48.70 
Full-time 93.52 49.91 
Special 0.87 1.39 
Mean current net earnings (€ in thousands) 16.54 11.16 
 
(9.55) (6.37) 
Mean lifetime net earnings (€ in thousands) 13.15 8.64 
 
(6.09) (4.42) 
Exit rate (%) 10.91 11.11 
Observations 2191 1152 
Note: standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
3.2. Financial Incentive Measures 
We compute the social security benefits for each individual, at all present and future possible 
retirement dates up to the NRA. We assume that the exit from employment is only possible 
through the four pathways described in section 2. The computation of benefits takes into 
account the eligibility conditions specific to each of the four programs. We next compute the 
net present discounted value of all future benefits associated with a given retirement path, that 
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we define as social security wealth (SSW). SSW for a worker of age a if he retires at age h ≥ 






where δ represents the discount factor with the interest rate set to 3%, T the life span, E[ ] the expected benefits at age s associated with a pathway l if the worker retires at age 
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where   is the worker’s benefit at age s if he is not married and retires at age a,  !" is the worker’s benefit at age s if he is married and retires at age a, )" is the 
worker’s survival benefit when he would have been aged s and retired at age a,  is the 
worker’s survival probability at age s conditional on being alive at age a and % is the 
spouse’s survival probability at age s conditional on being alive at age a7. For the 
unemployment, sickness or disability and conventional early retirement exit routes, the 
amounts of   and  !" correspond respectively to UI, DI and CER benefits 
(hereafter referred to as preretirement benefits) up to the NRA. We assume that after an old 
worker retires through one of these three routes and provided that he satisfies the eligibility 
conditions, he receives the same level of preretirement benefits until he reaches the NRA. 
After the NRA, the preretirement benefits are replaced by PP benefits. As for the pension exit 
route, a worker is assumed to receive 0 until he becomes eligible for the early retirement or 
reaches the NRA. After that, he can start claiming PP benefits that remain at the same level 
through the rest of his life.  
In our empirical analysis we use the weighted average of the SSW indicator of the previously 
derived incentives for the various exit paths (UI, DI, CER and PP). The weights are taken 
equal to the empirical instantaneous exit rates differentiated by age and gender. Based on this 
weighted SSW, we compute two dynamic incentive measures: social security accrual (SSA) 
and peak value (PV). These two indicators capture the incentive of staying in employment 
compared to withdraw from the labor force in the current period. Namely, SSA represents the 
difference in SSW if retirement is postponed by one year and is defined as 
* = +, −  
While PV equals the difference between SSW at future age where its maximum is reached 
and SSW today, that is, 
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Database. For computational reasons, we assume that the husband is 3 years older than the wife in our 
computation of expected benefits. 
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These two forward looking measures rely on the expected earnings as well as working and 
assimilated periods8 for all individuals at each future age up to the NRA. For simplicity, we 
assume that individuals’, when making their retirement decision, evaluate their future 
earnings prospects as being constant in real terms9. Table 3 provides mean and standard 
deviation of financial incentive indicators for men and women according to their retirement 
status. The differences between the two genders are considerable. On average, women have 
an almost 40% lower SSW than men. This comes as no surprise as women generally have 
shorter careers and lower lifetime earnings. Another factor that contributes to a larger amount 
of SSW of men is that they are more likely to benefit from a higher replacement rate for their 
PP benefits. This is due to the fact that in married couples, men are more often single earners 
or have much higher PP benefits than their spouses. They are therefore those who receive the 
household supplement. The retired individuals in the sample have on average lower SSW, 
regardless of gender. Additional descriptive statistics show that they also have lower current 
and lifetime earnings as well as shorter careers, which could explain the finding. The amount 
of SSA is on average negative for men and positive for women. However, the standard 
deviations are very high, revealing strong variability within the sample. As for PV, its average 
amount is positive for both genders and in absolute value much higher than that of SSA. This 
indicates the importance of looking beyond instantaneous effects. Table 3 also displays the 
percentage of individuals eligible for early retirement. The same argument, in terms of career 
and lifetime earnings, developed above can equally well apply to explain a higher percentage 
of eligible men as compared to women. As expected, the eligibility percentage is higher 
among the retired. 
Table 3. Social security incentives: by retirement status and gender 
Retirement status SSW SSA PV Eligible (%) 
  Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   
Men 
Not retired 167.61 (47.79) -0.33 (9.30) 10.66 (13.44) 13.88 
Retired 160.34 (57.32) -1.56 (9.90) 6.51 (15.22) 30.54 
All 166.82 (48.95) -0.46 (9.38) 10.21 (13.71) 15.70 
Women 
Not retired 107.61 (46.71) 1.06 (9.91) 16.18 (15.46) 11.04 
Retired 95.07 (55.71) 1.71 (8.85) 10.62 (13.98) 18.75 
All 106.22 (47.93)   1.13 (9.79)   15.56 (15.40) 11.89 
Note: monetary values are in € thousands. 
 
4. Empirical strategy and estimation results 
In order to analyze the retirement behavior of elderly, we estimate probit models that relate 
the retirement decision of workers to various independent variables including the constructed 
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9
 We also considered a 1.5% real growth rate. The results go in the same direction. 
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financial incentive indicators. We expect a positive effect of SSW on the retirement 
probability and a negative effect of both dynamic incentive measures. Indeed, individuals 
with higher levels of retirement wealth are more likely to retire earlier, holding all other 
variables constant. In contrast, greater accruals of that retirement wealth from additional work 
should encourage individuals to postpone their withdrawal from the labor force. Table 3 
reports the average estimated marginal effects of two different specifications, each including 
SSW and either SSA (Accrual) or PV (Peak value), for male and female workers separately. 
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if individual leaves employment during the year 
of 2001. Current earnings, average lifetime earnings and spouse’s earnings are in €1,000, and 
SSW, SSA and PV are expressed in €10,000.  
We further construct and include an eligibility indicator for conventional or standard early 
retirement (Eligible) as an independent variable. To our knowledge, only one study used this 
indicator as predictor of timing of retirement. Pienta (2003) in her study of couples’ 
retirement behavior in the United States found that pension eligibility increases the likelihood 
of being retired among men. Numerous other studies attempted to capture the effect of 
eligibility through inclusion into regression of age dummies. Jousten and Lefebvre (2013) and 
Dellis et al. (2004) found significantly higher exit rates from employment at the key social 
insurance eligibility ages. Although age is likely to be correlated with the eligibility variable, 
it is also the case for other variables of interest, such as the financial incentives of social 
insurance. Omitting eligibility may therefore result in misleading conclusions. This study 
exploits rich information available in the dataset which allows a rather accurate identification 
of the individual’s true eligibility for early retirement. The intuition is that older workers who 
meet the eligibility conditions are more likely to exit employment.  
The results reported in Table 4 indicate that financial incentives have an unexpected sign, but 
are mostly not statistically significant. On the one hand, the coefficient of SSW is negative for 
both men and women regardless of the model specification and is significant for men. This is 
somewhat surprising as it suggests that male workers with higher SSW have greater taste for 
work and thus retire later. Note that similar findings have already been reported in previous 
studies for Belgium, France and Italy (see Gruber and Wise (2004)). The negative effect of 
the SSW observed in our data can be explained by unobservable factors that could be 
correlated with both exit rates and SSW. Omitting them may bias the estimation results. 
Consider for example health and education indicators, if they are not controlled for, the effect 
of the SSW is likely to be underestimated. Another factor that could explain the negative 
effect of the SSW on the retirement probability is that the husband’s behavior could be 
influenced by his wife’s SSW. Indeed, as it already was mentioned, married men are more 
likely to benefit from household supplement to pension benefits than married women. As a 
consequence, a male worker who loses the household supplement because of a rise in his 
spouse’s pension benefits may leave the labor force sooner. This is due to the fact that the loss 
of household supplement is more than compensated by an increase in spouse’s income, 
resulting in a rise in the total SSW of the couple. We also examined the presence of outliers. 
Figure 1 shows the histogram of the SSW by gender. For men, the distribution tails off toward 
0 indicating that few male workers have very low SSW. Further analysis indicates that these 
observations are characterized by low average lifetime earnings and short careers with few 
assimilated periods. For example, these cases might correspond to cross-border workers for 
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whom we lack information on foreign professional experience10. In contrast, the distribution 
of the SSW for female workers is more symmetric with much larger share of observations 
near 0, principally a tribute to shorter and more incomplete careers. Beyond the arguments 
already cited for men, additional factors apply more specifically to women. Women are more 
likely to experience extended career breaks during their professional life (e.g. maternity). 
When we remove 1% or 5% of observations with lowest values of the SSW, represented by 
two vertical lines in Figure 1, the coefficient of SSW for men is still negative but no longer 
significant. For women, the effect of the SSW becomes positive but is still not significant. 
The estimated effects of other covariates are robust to changes in the sample.  
On the other hand, the estimates suggest that the dynamic incentive measures have no 
explanatory power in the likelihood of retiring, except the SSA for women. Surprisingly, the 
retirement probability of female workers seems to increase with one year accrual of the 
retirement wealth. One possible explanation is that women’ retirement decision might 
strongly depend on that of their husbands’. Consider, for example, wives with low value of 
the retirement wealth accrual whereas their husbands’ accrual is large. If the couple’s 
behavior is jointly determined and large values of husbands’ accrual push them to delay their 
retirement, wives are likely to postpone their retirement to match it with their husbands’. An 
inverse situation where women have large values of SSA but not their husbands would 
encourage both spouses to retire early. Several studies have found evidence in favor of strong 
preferences for a couple to retire jointly (see Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), Coile (2004), 
Pienta (2003)). Pienta (2003) analyzed retirement behavior of married couples and showed 
that a wife’s retirement decision is closely related to her husband’s characteristics such as 
occupational status and work intensity. These two factors, among others, influence an 
individual’s pension wealth. 
In sum, the financial incentives of social insurance don’t seem to have a lot of explanatory 
power in the retirement decision. On the contrary, the estimated coefficient of the eligibility 
status indicator is significantly positive for both samples of men and women regardless of the 
model specification. In the Peak value estimation for female workers, eligible and age 
variables appear individually not statistically significant but the test for their joint significance 
rejects the null hypothesis (at the 10% level). Being eligible for conventional or standard early 
retirement increases chances to leave employment by about 11% for men and from 5.6% to 
8.6% for women depending on the model specification. Although for women the average 
marginal effect of the eligibility status might be estimated less precisely due to a strong 
correlation with age, additional tests confirm the positive influence of the variable on the 
retirement probability.11 
                                                          
10
 In 2001 the share of cross border workers in the labor force was about 2.2% (source: Eurostat, LFS). Another 
factor that could contribute to an underestimation of the SSW is years of work in social insurance schemes other 
than the wage–earner scheme. However, given that workers with mixed employment statuses in 2001 were 
excluded from our sample, this problem should only be of limited importance. 
11
 We tried the same specification as in Table 4 run on a sub-sample of female workers aged 54 or more. This is 
the age at which the fraction of women eligible for early retirement turns positive. For this sub-sample, the 
marginal effect of the eligibility dummy reaches 11% and is statistically significant at the 10% level. We obtain 
similar effect when the linear age is replaced with age-specific dummies. 
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Table 4 shows that the estimated effects of the other explanatory variables are very similar 
between the models run with SSA or PV measures for a given sample. However, when these 
effects are compared between the two samples, there are some slight differences. For 
example, being in a part-time job has no effect on women while men with reduced hours of 
work are more likely to retire later. There are also no significant differences between regions 
for men, while women living in Flanders are likely to retire earlier than their Walloon 
counterpart. The marginal effect of the average lifetime earnings is positive and statistically 
significant for both genders but is slightly higher for women. Interestingly, being in a 
temporary job strongly increases the probability of retirement for both men and women as 
compared to a full-time job. The estimated marginal effect is around 53% and 35% for 




Table 4. Probit estimates of labor force exit, by gender (average marginal effects)12 
Men Women 
  Accrual Peak value Accrual Peak value 
Social security incentives 
Eligible 0.1126*** 0.1086*** 0.0855* 0.0558 
(0.0338) (0.0330) (0.0476) (0.0435) 
SSW -0.0035** -0.0035* -0.0017 -0.0027 
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0028) 
SSA, PV 0.0036 0.0007 0.0222** -0.0035 
(0.0070) (0.0062) (0.0096) (0.0078) 
Income variables 
Earnings -0.0123*** -0.0122*** -0.0132*** -0.0127*** 
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Average lifetime earnings 0.0069*** 0.0068*** 0.0075* 0.0094** 
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0042) (0.0043) 
Socio-economic variables 
Age 0.0066** 0.0069** 0.0031 0.0035 
(0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0039) 
Family status (ref.: Single) 
In couple 0.0136 0.0132 0.0015 0.0019 
(0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0252) (0.0253) 
Active partner -0.0149 -0.0147 -0.0382 -0.0376 
(0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0274) (0.0276) 
Age difference 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0010 
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Partner's earnings 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Region (ref.: Wallonia) 
Flanders -0.0041 -0.0043 0.0388* 0.0401** 
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0201) (0.0201) 
Brussels -0.0319 -0.0321 0.0393 0.0356 
(0.0246) (0.0245) (0.0348) (0.0345) 
Blue collar -0.0202 -0.0199 0.0214 0.0230 
(0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0237) (0.0238) 
Intensity of current job (ref.: Full-time) 
Part-time -0.0385* -0.0386* -0.0191 -0.0199 
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0213) (0.0214) 
Temporary job 0.5269*** 0.5292*** 0.3558*** 0.3503*** 
  (0.1241) (0.1239) (0.1274) (0.1283) 
Observations 2191 2191 1152 1152 
Log-Likelihood 
-650.4 -650.6 -343.4 -345.9 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard errors of marginal effects 
are presented in parentheses. Current earnings are included as a quadratic polynomial. Other control 
variables are activity sector dummies. 
 
                                                          
12
 We also tried a more parsimonious specification where we added cross-products of financial incentive 
variables with eligibility dummy. The results are comparable to those displayed in Table 4. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of the SSW: by gender 
 
Figure 2 displays actual instantaneous exit rates out of the labor force and probabilities 
predicted by the fitted model, both averaged by age. The differences between the observed 
exit rates and predicted probabilities are due to a failure of the model to fully capture the 
nonlinearities in the age pattern of retirement. That is, although the eligibility indicator is 
included, a linear age specification may be too restrictive to capture preferences and 
incentives at particular ages. 
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5. Policy simulations 
In light of our findings in the previous section, we analyse the effect on retirement probability 
of a policy reform that changes the eligibility rules for early retirement. We consider that the 
effect is captured exclusively through the eligibility measure which is adapted along with the 
introduced changes.13 We then contrast the results of these simulated changes with the 
baseline where the social security system is left unchanged, i.e. with the rules that prevailed in 
our reference year of 2001 (hereafter referred to as Baseline). For simplicity, we present the 
simulation results based on the Accrual model - this choice is based on the log-likelihood and 
does not substantially affect the outcome presented in this section. 
The policy reform we propose (hereafter called Delayed eligibility) is inspired by the 2012 
reform enacted by Belgian government that we described in section 2.5 (leaving aside 
grandfathering and preferential regimes). It consists in an increase of two years in the standard 
and conventional early retirement ages as well as in a tightening of the career length required 
to be eligible for these two programs. That is, an individual can start claiming PP benefits at 
the ERA of 62 (instead of 60 for the Baseline) given he proves 40-year career history (28-year 
for the Baseline). The CER benefits are available from the age of 60 (compared to 58 for the 
Baseline) with at least 40 years of career requirement (25 years for the Baseline). In order to 
evaluate the effect of these simulated changes, we first compare the survival probability 
functions generated before and after the revision of the social security system for the sub-
sample of people aged 50 (i.e. 1951 birth cohort). Based on these functions, we then predict 
the change in the median retirement age for this 1951 cohort resulting from the policy reform. 
Similar results, available upon request, are obtained for older cohorts. 
Figure 3 shows the simulated employment survival probability curve for the cohort born in 
1951 (currently aged 50), derived from the estimates reported in Table 3. To obtain this 
predicted survival, we assume that, conditional on the observed characteristics of the 
individuals, the current transition probabilities remain constant in the future. We also hold the 
individuals’ observed characteristics constant when predicting the hazard rate at each future 
age. Note that for women the estimation of the survival probability beyond the age of 62 is 
less precise as it is based on the out-of-sample predictions. The curve presents quite similar 
pattern for male and female workers until age 57, though the drop in survival probability is 
slightly more important for women. After 57, the difference widens and women have 
relatively higher probability to remain in the labor force.  
  
                                                          
13
 The impact of the financial incentives is neutralized. When we allow the simulation outcome to depend on the 
eligibility and financial incentives both subject to the generated policy changes, the results are only marginally 
affected by the reform. This is due to the fact that the positive influence of eligibility variable is buffered by the 
counterintuitive effects found for the financial incentives.  
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Figure 3. Simulated employment survival probability for 1951 cohort (currently aged 50): by 
gender and possible age of retirement (Baseline)14 
 
To get a more precise impression of how the path towards the NRA is affected by the early 
retirement eligibility criteria, Figure 4 displays the percentage of 1951 cohort eligible for 
conventional or standard early retirement benefits at each possible age of retirement. In our 
construction of the eligibility indicator we assume that access to CER benefits is granted 
automatically upon application if the eligibility conditions are satisfied.15 Thus, the eligibility 
rates reflect the maximum percentage of individuals potentially eligible for conventional (or 
standard) early retirement. Two different curves are plotted for each gender: representing 
Baseline case and Delayed eligibility reform. First, as shown for the Baseline, although the 
eligibility rate of men at a given retirement age is higher as compared to women, their age 
pattern is quite similar. Until age of retirement 54 (53 for women), the percentage of workers 
eligible for early retirement benefits is 0%. It then grows slowly to reach almost 1/3 of the 
sub-sample (1/5 for women) at age of retirement 57. The positive fraction of workers eligible 
for early retirement before the minimum age of 58 is due to the possibility within specific 
activity sectors to retire through CER as of age 54. The large rise for both sexes at age of 
retirement 58 is explained by relaxed requirements for CER for all sectors. At that point, 95% 
of men (82% of women) potentially satisfy eligibility conditions. This sharp rise is followed 
by a more steady increase in eligibility rates towards the NRA. The differences in the 
eligibility rates between men and women for a given age of retirement are smaller than would 
have been expected. Indeed, Belgian women on average have substantially shorter careers 
than men. However, our simulations are focusing on women born in 1951 who are employed 
in 2001, and hence not the Belgian female population at large. The second observation from 
Figure 4 is that the impact of the Delayed eligibility reform is different for male and female 
workers as a result of differing baseline career lengths. For men, the effect is strongest below 
age 60, due to the increase in eligibility ages. For women, the effect is mostly driven by the 
                                                          
14
 In our analyses for women, we report results until the age of 65 as the NRA for 1951 birth cohort is equal to 
65 for both genders. 
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stricter career requirements, particularly after reaching age 60. Indeed, beyond that age the 
drop in eligibility rates due to policy changes is deeper for female workers.  
Figure 4. Percentage of individuals eligible for conventional or standard early retirement 
among 1951 cohort (currently aged 50): by gender and possible age of retirement (Baseline 
and Delayed eligibility) 
 
Figure 5 presents the difference between the predicted employment survival for the cohort 
born in 1951 (currently aged 50) if the Delayed eligibility policy changes are applied and the 
same survival curve estimated in the Baseline case. For the initial 50-55 age range, the 
predicted survival remains unchanged which is consistent with the results obtained in the 
previous section and the eligibility rates depicted in Figure 4. The Delayed eligibility reform 
increases the probability of survival in the labor force over the 55-65 age range for both men 
and women. The maximum increase of 12.6 percentage points for men (7.5 percentage points 
for women) is reached at 60 years old (61 for women).  
Figure 5. Difference in predicted employment survival between Delayed eligibility and 
























































Based on the predicted employment survival, we estimate the median retirement age for this 
1951 cohort. The results are reported in Table 5. For the baseline, the estimated median 
retirement age of women is higher than that of men. That is, we would expect 50% of 50 
years old female workers to be still employed by age 58.6. The estimated median retirement 
age for male workers is 6 months lower. If we change the eligibility rules for early retirement, 
the expected median retirement age increases by nearly 1 year for both genders, reaching 59 
for men and 59.5 for women.  
Table 5. Predicted median retirement age for 1951 cohort (currently aged 50): by gender 
(percentage change to Baseline in parentheses)  
Men Women 
Baseline 58.1 58.6 
Delayed eligibility 59.0 (+1.4%)   59.5 (+1.6%) 
Observations 272     192   
 
From our analyses, we conclude that a uniform change in eligibility requirements for early 
retirement affects men and women in a different way. That is, an increase in the minimum 
early retirement age has strongest impact on men as they are more likely to be eligible for 
early retirement compared to women. By contrast, tightening career requirement for early 
retirement affects women the most due to their generally shorter careers. As a result, the 
simulations predict an increase by approximately 1 year in the median retirement age for men 
and women born in 1951.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we analyzed the role of the Belgian social security system in the retirement 
behavior of the older workforce. We studied a sample of wage earners aged 50-64 drawn from 
Belgian administrative data. The richness of this individual-level data allowed us to compute 
rather accurate indicators of financial incentives and of benefit eligibility. More precisely, we 
derived a measure of the personal social security wealth, two forward-looking financial 
incentive indicators and an eligibility dummy for early retirement. Our two main findings can 
be summarized as follows. First, the results of the econometric analysis reveal that the 
financial incentives variables do not have the expected sign and are often not statistically 
significant. Second, there is strong evidence in favor of an eligibility effect. In particular, our 
models showed that being eligible for early retirement substantially increases the probability 
to withdraw from the labor force. Thus, our findings suggest that the timing of retirement is 
driven by the eligibility status, rather than the financial incentives. 
The obtained estimates were used to simulate changes in the eligibility rules for the early 
retirement schemes. We studied the impact of a simultaneous 2-years increase in the 
conventional and standard early retirement minimum ages combined with a tightening in the 
career requirement for these schemes, in line with recent policy trends in Belgium. Our 
findings show that the simulated delay, as measured by the change in the median retirement 
age, is of approximately 1 year, and this independently of the sex of the worker. For men most 
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of this increase is due to the shift in the minimum early retirement age, while for women the 
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